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Introduction
Long-term issues such as the European unemployment problem appear to be difficult for politicians to solve. 1 In this paper we suggest that competition between politicians for incentive contracts and elections can motivate them to undertake socially desirable longterm projects while at the same time preserving the democratic legitimation of politicians.
We consider a model where two candidates compete for office in an initial election period and for subsequent reelection. Candidates are motivated by the offices they hold and by the policies they undertake. Once a candidate is elected he can undertake socially desirable long-term projects, opt for inefficient short-term projects or stick to the status quo. Returns from long-term projects only accrue to voters in a second election period.
The problem for the public is that the discount factor of the politician may be smaller than that of the electorate. In such cases, the public cannot sufficiently motivate a politician to invest in long-term projects, even if the public could commit itself to reelection.
To alleviate these inefficiencies we suggest the electorate use a hierarchy of incentive contracts and elections. Candidates are given the possibility of offering incentive contracts when campaigning for office for the first election period. The incentive contract stipulates that in the event of reelection the politician's utility or income in the second election period depends on policy returns such as the level of unemployment. Incentive contracts become binding as soon as the politician decides to stand for reelection and is actually reelected. Candidates are free to offer empty contracts or contracts making their income depend on long-term returns.
Our findings are as follows: First, if the discount factor is below a certain threshold, the public cannot motivate the politician to undertake long-term projects by elections alone.
This also holds if the public commits itself to a reelection scheme. The politician will simply value the short-term benefits for voters too highly. Second, when politicians can offer incentive contracts and the public commits itself to a reelection scheme, the result is a unique equilibrium. Both politicians offer the same contract. The equilibrium contract stipulates future transfers ensuring that the politician with the lower discount factor will be indifferent about choosing the long-term project or the short-term project. The politician with the larger discount factor is elected; his prospects of reelection are sure-fire and he will take the socially efficient long-term decision.
In the following, we relax two of the assumptions upon which the previous findings have built. Our third result shows that the hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts will still induce politicians to undertake socially beneficial long-term projects even if the public cannot commit itself to any future reelection behavior. We consider two reasons why current voters may not be able to commit themselves to a certain future voting behavior: the democratic requirement for unconstrained voting in every election and incentives to reject the incumbent in order to economize on his future remunerations. 2 In the former case, future transfers to an elected politician undertaking the long-term project must be higher in equilibrium. In the second case, incentive contracts must include a golden parachute clause guaranteeing a future bonus to a politician even he is no longer in office.
In our fourth result we allow for the case where the public does not know the discount factors of politicians competing for office. In the corresponding game between politicians and the public under asymmetric information, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all types of politicians will undertake the beneficial long-term project. Under uncertainty about the politician's discount factor, the public will have to grant benefits to the politician corresponding to the benefits under certainty with the lowest possible realization of the discount factor.
To sum up, competition among politicians for the hierarchy of incentive contracts and elections appears to be a reasonably robust mechanism for inducing socially efficient decision-making. There are, however, a number of practical issues regarding the application of the hierarchy of incentive contracts and elections which we will address in the final section. The actual reach of the dual mechanism can only be judged after these avenues have been explored.
In this paper, we introduce competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections as a novel element in politics. While there is no further literature on competition for incentive contracts by politicians, there is a rapidly growing literature on incentive contracts for central bankers dating back to Walsh (1995b) . The government can impose a penalty if it can verify that the central bank did not try to meet its target levels. 3 In this paper, we discuss how incentive elements can be combined with the democratic requirement of pe-2 The second reason is less important since the remuneration of a politician creates only a negligible burden per capita for the public. 3 For the theory of the enforcement of such arrangements and the nature of penalties see Persson and Tabellini (1993) , Walsh (1995a Walsh ( , 1995b , Lockwood (1997) and Svensson (1997) .
3 riodic reelections. We suggest that competition among politicians for incentive contracts and periodic reelection can be a solution to the democratic dilemma deriving from the fact that politicians may have insufficient incentives to undertake socially efficient policies.
For simplicity, we consider a political economy model where politicians and voters differ with respect to their relative valuation of future and current utilities. This is a tractable model for the analysis of how competition for incentive contracts and elections may alleviate inefficiencies in democracies. In practice, as is discussed in the concluding section, democracies may produce inefficiencies for a wide variety of reasons and it is not clear whether the source of inefficiency we are focusing on is the most important one. However, the ideas presented in this paper may be useful when applied to other kinds of inefficiencies in political processes.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we outline the model and our assumptions. In section 3, we consider the potentialities and limitations of the election mechanism for achieving optimal decisions. In section 4, we show that competition among politicians for incentive contracts and election induces socially optimal decisions.
In section 5, we extend our analysis to the non-commitment case. In section 6, we discuss asymmetric information. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 Model and Assumptions
The game we are analyzing is a dynamic game with two periods. We assume that the political business cycles where politicians adopt short-term policies instead of long-term policies before elections thus leading to upturns before and downturns after elections, 5 or investments in infrastructure requiring a temporary cutdown on consumption but producing positive returns at a later stage.
We assume that a politician can generate private returns if he realizes social returns larger than the returns of the status quo and as long as he is in power. The social returns from the status quo have been normalized to zero. If he is in power and realizes a social project return V in a given period, we assume that his private benefits are:
where α is some number 0 § α § 1. The above assumption is justified by the observation that high returns enable the agent to channel some returns to interest groups that support him, as is suggested by the large literature in public choice (see e.g. Mueller 1989 ).
Alternatively, the politician is genuinely concerned about the social returns he generates in given periods. We follow the latter interpretation, which allows us to focus exclusively on the discounting problem. 6 We concentrate on the agent's utility in period 1 when politicians stand for election for the first time. We assume that the utility of an agent increases both in the private benefits from holding office, given by B ¦ 0, and from the private benefits of investment projects.
In particular, we assume To simplify the exposition we use 5 The literature on political business cycles started with Nordhaus (1975) and Ben-Porath (1975) and was expanded to ideological business cycles by Hibbs (1977) . In Rogoff (1990) , Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) , Hibbs (1992) , Persson and Tabellini (1993) , the theory has been adapted to incorporate rational expectations and information asymmetries. 6 The first interpretation yields the same qualitative conclusions, but the public needs to take into account that some returns from projects are channeled to the politician or the interest group supporting him.
to denote the utility of an elected politician i if he has offered the con-
, undertakes LT P and is reelected:
to denote the utility of an elected politician i if he has offered C i
undertakes ST P and is reelected:
undertakes ST P and does not stand for reelection:
We allow for the fact that politicians may differ in their discount factor δ i
In many cases such differences are known to the public. Consider for example the election race between incumbent Kohl and challenger Schröder in 1998 in Germany. It was wellknown that Kohl was competing for a final term whereas Schröder wanted to start his era as chancellor. Therefore, we assume in the following that δ 1 and δ 2 are known to the public and we label candidates such that δ 1 δ 2 . Later we will relax the informational assumptions about discount factors.
We denote the expected returns from the options ST P£ LT P and NOT by EV S £ E V L , and EV N , respectively. Thus:
δ is the discount factor of the public
The preceding assumption immediately implies that in social terms the optimal policy is LT P. To simplify the presentation, we employ three tie-breaking rules. First, if two politicians generate the same social welfare, the public will elect the politician with the 7 higher discount factor. Second, if both politicians are equally good in terms of social welfare and are identical in terms of the discount factor, both politicians have the same
2 of being elected. Third, if a politician is indifferent as to two types of policies, he will select the one that yields higher social welfare. These tie-breaking rules simplify the exposition but are not essential for the results.
Elections
In this section we discuss how the public can motivate politicians to undertake LTP if the only available instrument is the election mechanism. We assume that the public can 
The politician cannot be motivated by elections to undertake LT P
Proof :
It is obvious that the politician will never choose NOT under any reelection scheme, because he benefits equally or more from LT P or ST P. Additionally, it obvious that the optimal reelection scheme for voters is q 
8 Therefore, if m ¦ 0, we have a range for the discount factor at which politicians will not choose the socially efficient policy. Note that voters are assumed to be fully rational and infer negative future returns from the positive returns of short-term projects in the first election period. 7
Competition for the Incentive Contracts
In this section we consider the whole game and allow politicians to offer incentive contracts before the first election takes place. We still assume in this section that voters can commit themselves to a reelection scheme in stage 1, in order to compare the competition for incentive contracts and elections with the previous section. We obtain:
There then exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
Proof :
The condition ensures that the public is better off committing itself to reelection and ac- 
which gives equation (8) . Since the incentive contract is irrelevant if a candidate does not want to stand for reelection we have:
Because of δ 1 § δ 2 we have:
Candidate 2 has a strict preference for LT P if elected, in contrast to the indifference as to LT P and ST P of candidate 1 if elected.
To establish equilibrium, we consider four possible deviations from the equilibrium described in proposition 2. 
Thus politician 2 will not be elected although he chooses LT P because candidate 1 demands less transfer and chooses LT P in accordance with our tie-breaking rule. 
But
; thus the public will elect candidate 2 because he undertakes LT P.
Third, suppose candidate 1 deviates to C 1
Then the public will not elect politician 1, even if he were to undertake LT P, because for voters the payments to the politician are lower when the second candidate is elected. Therefore the deviation is not profitable.
Finally, it is obvious that the second candidate has no incentive to offer a contract C 2
β, because he would receive lower transfers in the second period and in equilibrium can be sure of being elected anyhow.
Uniqueness follows in a similar way. For any offer constellation C 1
with β i ( ¢ β for at least one candidate, one of the politicians has an incentive to deviate by
or by offering an incentive contract that requires slightly fewer transfers from the public 8 .
Proposition 2 shows that the hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts eliminates inefficient decision-making in politics at the cost of future transfers to the elected politician.
Both politicians offer the same contract. The equilibrium contract stipulates future transfers ensuring that the politician with the lower discount factor will be indifferent about choosing the long-term project or the short-term project. The politician with the larger discount factor is elected; his prospects of reelection are certain and he will take the socially efficient long-term decision.
In the following, we relax the assumptions upon which the result has built. In proposition 2 voters are assumed to commit themselves to a state-dependent reelection scheme. Competition for incentive contracts and election can still work if the public can only commit itself to a fixed reelection probability, as is illustrated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1
Suppose the public could only commit itself to a fixed reelection probability. Then the equilibrium with β in proposition 2 still holds correspondingly with q 1
The proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 2 because (15) 11
Competition without Commitment
The assumption that voters can commit themselves to a reelection scheme has mainly been made in order to give the election mechanism the best chance to motivate political leaders to invest in long-term, efficient projects. However, from a strictly democratic point of view, voters are unable to commit future citizens to adhere to a particular voting behavior.
The contracting problem is rooted in the uncertainty about future electoral interests and the liberal principle of democracies to allow for free and anonymous voting behavior in elections.
The impossibility of commitment to future voting behavior represents another source of inefficiency outlined in Glazer (1989) , Gersbach (1993) and Besley and Coate (1998) and in related work by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) , Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) . We can easily integrate the impossibility of commitment into our model. There are two non-commitment problems: incentives of voters to reject an incumbent so as to economize on his future remunerations and the democratic requirement for unconstrained voting in every election. We deal with the latter case first. Suppose there is complete uncertainty about the voting behavior of future generations such that an elected politician today has an a priori expectation of reelection of q i ¢ 1 2 independently of his actions in the past. This is an opposite pole to the commitment case where q i is either 1 if the choice of LT P is expected or 0 otherwise. Though we think that intermediate cases are the most plausible, it is instructive to compare these polar opposites. For the non-commitment case we obtain:
The proof is analogous to the commitment case. The only difference is that the utility in the second period must be evaluated with q 1
It is obvious that under non-commitment it requires a higher future transfer to make the politician with the lower discount factor indifferent as to LT P and ST P. The impossibility of the present generation of voters to commit future voters to a particular election choice entails the larger transfer a reelected politician must receive if he undertakes LT P.
There might be a second and even more extreme case of non-commitment if voters at the reelection date definitely reject the incumbent, in order to economize on future remunerations for the politician. In this case the nature of the incentive contracts can be amended in the following way. The incentive contract becomes effective if the politician stands for reelection, independently of whether he is reelected. Thus, he can receive future benefits from LT P even if he is not in office anymore. We call such incentive contracts golden parachute contracts; they are denoted by C Pa . The utility for a politician if he is not reelected is denoted by U para i and given by
We immediately obtain:
and politicians can offer golden parachute contracts and the politician elected in period 1 is rejected with certainty. There then exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where politicians offer golden parachute contracts.
with
The proof is analogous to the previous proposition. Note that β NCPa is determined by
because a politician is not forced to offer a parachute contract. While we have assumed an extreme case of non-commitment in proposition 4, it is obvious that the option to offer golden parachute contracts also works for intermediate values of reelection probability when standard contracts cannot induce LT P with lower costs for the public.
Asymmetric Information
While politicians' discount factors may be well-known in some circumstances, there may be more uncertainty in other cases. For instance, when two politicians are competing for office for the first time, the public may be uncertain about the preferences of the politicians and in particular about discount factors. To explore how asymmetric information affects the functioning of the dual mechanism -incentive contracts and elections -we assume that the public knows that both politicians competing for office have discount factors δ H with probability w and δ L § δ H with probability 1 w. We assume that politicians know the discount factor of their opponent. 9 We further use b i
to denote the beliefs of the public that politician i has discount factor δ H when incentive contracts C 1
have been offered. Then we look for perfect Bayesian equilibria in the election and the incentive contract game. We obtain:
9 The assumption appears to be plausible because of the superior knowledge politicians have about each other through their daily interaction. However, the equilibrium also exists in the case of asymmetric information of politicians about each other's discount factor.
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Proposition 5
There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 10
(ii) An elected politician chooses LT P in equilibrium (iii)
(iv)
(v)
Proof :
We first observe that for β i ' β AI both types of politicians choose LT P independently of whether they have high or low discount factors. Thus, in equilibrium politicians choose 10 We have not found another equilibrium yet. But it is not clear whether the one in proposition 5 is unique.
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LT P which validates 
The first politician will choose LT P independently of his type and will thus be elected because the public is not sure about the other one.
The politician with a high discount factor will choose LT P and the other one ST P.
But the public does not know which politician will undertake LT P. So politician 1 will be elected since it is cheaper for the public.
Independently of type neither politician will choose LT P. Thus, the public will elect the first politician, who offers a lower transfer βV 2 .
Since the politicians offer the same contract and they are homogeneous, both have equal probability of being elected.
!
In all other cases the utility associated with the election of the second candidate is always higher for the voters.
Proposition 5 shows that the hierarchy of incentive contracts and elections also works under incomplete information. But β AI is evaluated at the lower discount factor and thus the public is forced to accept transfers to the politician higher than those expected when the public knew δ to be either δ L or δ H in advance. The expected transfer in the latter case would amount to
Conclusion
Our simple analysis suggest that the dual mechanism of competition for elections and incentive contracts might alleviate some of the inefficiencies in democratic decisionmaking. However, there are many issues still waiting to be be examined before the dual mechanism could be proposed for democracies on a solid theoretical basis.
A critical issue for the application of incentive contracts and elections is the multi-task problem politicians usually face. Politicians in the executive and legislative branch deal with many different issues. Moreover, other issues, such as reforming health care, cannot be measured with any major precision in performance terms. The problem of how multi-task activities and measurement problems can be integrated into the hierarchy of incentive contracts and elections will need to be explored in future research (see Gersbach and Liessem 2000). There are a number of further practical issues, for instance the quantitative measures that should be used for the incentive contract. In the case of European unemployment this is relatively obvious, because the incentive contract can use the average unemployment rate. But there can be a definition problem here given that the unemployment rate is defined in many different ways. Hence there is a need to agree upon a definition that is not susceptible of change or manipulation. Also, enforcing the incentive contract will require a special court which could be a separate entity of the constitutional court.
Finally, the literature has identified a number of further important inefficiencies in the political system (see Mueller (1989) , Dixit (1998) How the dual mechanism can be applied for these kinds of inefficiencies and for more sophisticated political-economic models might be a useful extension. An even more challenging task would be the use of incentive contracts when policies are determined through a combination of decisions at the federal and the local level. For instance, in the new framework introduced by Crémer and Palfrey (2000) , the federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum policy. In this framework, voters choose federal mandates that are too strict. Whether supplementing this two-tier government by incentive contracts at the federal or local level would lead to more efficient provision of public
goods is an open question. The actual reach of the dual mechanism can only be judged after these avenues have been explored.
